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WHY NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION REQUIRE A SECOND 
LOOK: THE BATTLE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT 
FREEDOM IN THE UNIVERSITY SETTING 
Rebecca D. Ryan+ 
Chief Justice John Roberts recently articulated, 
the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only 
to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative 
social costs and benefits.  The First Amendment itself reflects a 
judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions 
on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses 
any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some 
speech is not worth it.1 
Although Chief Justice Roberts’ words reflect the traditional importance of 
First Amendment freedoms, the application of such freedoms in the university 
setting is fading.2  State universities’ interests in non-discrimination and 
diversity policies have trumped students’ First Amendment claims of freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of expressive association.3  
Student groups that advocate messages contrary to the public norm are 
confronted with increasing pressure to alter their messages and membership 
requirements.4  Should they fail to do so, these student groups must forgo the  
                                                 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A. 2008, Westmont College. The author wishes to thank Professor Robert Destro for his 
insight, thoughtful commentary, and advice, as well as Tim Chandler at the Blackstone Legal 
Fellowship for his direction and inspiration in pursuing this piece.  A special thanks to my 
husband, Ben, and my family for their love and support—and to my mom an additional thanks for 
years of support and editorial review. 
 1. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).  In Stevens, the Court struck 
down a statute that banned depictions of animal cruelty for commercial use.  Id. at 1592. 
 2. Craig B. Anderson, Political Correctness of College Campuses: Freedom of Speech v. 
Doing the Politically Correct Thing, 46 SMU L. REV. 171, 175–77 (1992) (foreshadowing the 
“rise of a political correctness on college campuses” that “threatens to severely limit” First 
Amendment rights). 
 3. See infra Part IV.A; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny Thing Happened on the 
Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on “Equal Access” for Religious 
Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 663 (1996). 
 4. See, John Roberts, Professor Says Vanderbilt Suppressing Christian Student Groups 
Amid Shutdown Threats, FOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/09/2 
6/professor-says-vanderbilt-suppressing-christian-student-groups-amid-shutdown/ (noting the 
struggle at Vanderbilt, where student organizations cannot require their leadership to adhere to 
the group’s beliefs and that “[c]arried to its full extent, [this] means an atheist could lead a 
Christian group, a man a woman’s group, a Jew a Muslim group or vice versa”). 
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benefits of official recognition in the university setting.5 
Whether to concede to this pressure is a difficult decision for these student 
groups to make, and it is likely unconstitutional for universities to force these 
student groups to decide.  Yet, criticizing a university’s non-discrimination and 
diversity policies in any forum is a daunting challenge.  Universities have a 
valid educational interest and government prerogative in promoting diversity 
and   non-discrimination.6    American   society’s   cultural   approval   of   
non-discrimination also endorses these universities’ policies.7  This support 
helps justify the choice to pursue radical equality, permitting society and the 
courts to shy away from close scrutiny of the reasoning behind—and 
implementation of—such policies.8  However, while non-discrimination 
policies serve an essential purpose, “those purposes are contravened when  
non-discrimination policies are misused.”9  Therefore, the courts must resolve 
this nuanced and multifaceted conflict between expressive association and  
non-discrimination in a manner that addresses its complexity and rejects 
oversimplification.  Due to the important constitutional rights at stake, close 
scrutiny of non-discrimination policies is critical and entirely proper.10 
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals case, Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, bypassing an important 
opportunity to address the analysis and rationale behind state universities’ 
choice to value non-discrimination over diversity, and conformity over First 
                                                 
 5. See, e.g., Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012). 
 6. See Christian Andrew D. Brown, Do As I Say, Not As I Do: The Myth of Neutrality in 
Nondiscrimination Policies at Public Universities, 91 N.C. L. REV. 280, 303–04 (2012); Legal 
Soc’y  Chapter  of  the  Univ.  of  Cal.,  Hastings  Coll.  of  the  Law  v.  Martinez,  130  S.  Ct. 
2971, 2989–90 (2010) (describing an “all-comers policy” as one that “encourages tolerance, 
cooperation, and learning among students”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) 
(affirming a school’s “compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student 
body”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (stating that diversity “is a 
constitutionally permissible goal” that promotes a “robust exchange of ideas”). 
 7. See Richard Thompson Ford, Moving Beyond Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, 
at A31. 
 8. See, e.g., Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990–91 (stating that a university may promote policies 
favoring “state-law proscriptions on discrimination”). 
 9. Brief for Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, 
Alpha Delta, 123 S. Ct. 1743 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-744) [hereinafter CLS Brief]; see 
also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and University Policies Against 
Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: Implications of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369, 403 (1994) (cautioning against “diversity that is achieved by 
coercing dissenters into conforming”). 
 10. See, Paulsen, supra note 3, at 669 (stating that state universities are applying university 
or local non-discrimination laws to religious-affiliated student organizations, the appreciation of 
which threatens the organizations’ First Amendment rights); see also, Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 
369. 
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Amendment freedoms.11  Previously, the Supreme Court decided Christian 
Legal Society v. Martinez, a prominent limited forum case, in which the Court 
approved a state university’s “all-access” non-discrimination policy that 
applied to student associations.12  The policy prohibited student associations 
from establishing eligibility requirements for voting membership and 
leadership positions based on compliance with the groups’ missions or 
beliefs.13  Upholding the constitutionality of the policy, the Court highlighted 
the reasonable relationship between the policy and the school’s academic 
mission.14  Martinez, however, addressed only the specific question posed in 
the petition for certiorari15 and left several key questions unresolved:16 (1) was 
the university’s “all-access” policy non-discriminatory in design and 
implementation?;17   and   (2)   whether   the   university   had   a   “selective   
non-discrimination” policy, and if so, was such a policy constitutional?18 
                                                 
 11. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 
S.Ct. 1743 (2012).  
 12. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995.  An “all-access” policy as defined in Martinez mandates 
the acceptance of all students into all student groups.  Id. at 2979. 
 13. Id. at 2979–80. 
 14. Id. at 2991.  A reasonable relationship is a key part of the First Amendment analysis 
with respect to limited forums.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 829 (1995) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804–06 
(1985)) (“Once it has opened a limited forum, however, the State . . . may not exclude speech 
where its distinction is not ‘reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum . . . .’”). 
 15. The questions posed were: (1) Whether a state university can deny a religious affiliated 
organization recognition because the group requires members to affirm their belief with the 
group’s faith; and (2) “Whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it held . . . that the Constitution 
allows a state law school to deny recognition to a religious student organization because the group 
requires its officers and voting members to agree with its core religious viewpoints.”  Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-1371). 
 16. The majority upheld the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the university’s all-access policy 
was viewpoint neutral and reasonable.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2981–82.  The dissent disagreed, 
noting  that  CLS  did  not  claim  that  its  application  was  denied  due  to  a  violation  of  an 
“accept-all-comers policy,” but because its “bylaws did not comply with the Nondiscrimination 
Policy.”  Id. at 3005 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 17. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 
(1993) (holding that “[f]acial neutrality is not determinative” and the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Establishment Clause “forbid[] subtle departures from neutrality . . . [and] covert suppression 
of particular religious beliefs”).  Government action targeting religious groups must be neutral 
both on its face and as applied.  See id. (discussing how “distinctive treatment cannot be shielded 
by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality . . . [as] [t]he Free Exercise Clause 
protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt”). 
 18. “Selective” non-discrimination policies are somewhat paradoxical in name.  By 
definition, these policies are facially discriminatory.  See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 
648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ripple, J., concurring), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012).  
As a result, these policies rest on a claim that a state university has significant authority to 
regulate   many   First   Amendment   freedoms.    See   id.   At   800.    However,   selective   
non-discrimination policies also raise questions of equal protection.  See Michael A. Paulsen, 
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause 
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 327 (1986); William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, A 
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Of particular importance is the unanswered question of the constitutionality 
of selective non-discrimination policies,19 which are policies that prohibit 
discrimination based on categories such as “race, color, religion, national 
origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation.”20  Recently, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in Alpha Delta v. Reed and held that such 
selective non-discrimination policies were constitutional.21  This ruling is in 
stark contrast to a 2006 opinion by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
which the court held that selective non-discrimination policies constitute patent 
viewpoint discrimination and violate the First Amendment.22  Given the split 
among the circuits on the constitutionality of such specifically delineated  
non-discrimination policies,23 this issue remains ripe for Supreme Court 
review.24 
This Note discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Alpha Delta and 
analyzes how the holding diverges from prior cases on the constitutionality of 
university non-discrimination policies that affect religiously affiliated student 
organizations.  This Note begins by tracing the development of limited forum 
jurisprudence and the affirmative defenses that have been raised to legitimize 
states’ restrictions within such forums.  This Note then analyzes the impact of 
Martinez on First Amendment freedoms and closely examines the Supreme 
Court’s holding on non-discrimination policies in a limited forum.  Next, this 
Note discusses the most recent circuit court case on the issue, Alpha Delta, and 
examines its implications.  Finally, this Note proposes that the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 261 
EDUC. L. REP. 473, 476 (Dec. 2010). 
 19. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 795–96 (acknowledging that the Martinez Court “expressly 
declined to address whether [the] holdings would extend to a narrower non-discrimination policy 
that, instead of prohibiting all membership restrictions, prohibited membership restrictions only 
on certain specified bases, for example, race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation”). 
 20. See e.g., id. at 796 (prohibiting group membership requirements that violate the school’s 
non-discrimination policy). 
 21. Id. at 805. 
 22. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 23. Compare Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 805 (holding that the selective non-discrimination 
policy is constitutional),  with  Walker,  453  F.3d  at  866  (holding  that,  even  if  the  selective 
non-discrimination policy is viewpoint neutral on its face, the policy is not viewpoint neutral in 
its application). 
 24. See also Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 805 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“[I]t may well be that, at 
some later point, this case will be an appropriate case for further Supreme Court review.”). 
Interestingly, in February 2013, the University of Michigan ejected the Asian chapter of 
InterVarsity Christian Fellowship because they required members to sign a statement of faith.  
Eric Owens, University of Michigan Allegedly Ejects Christian Group in the Name of Tolerance, 
DAILY CALLER (February 5, 2013) http://dailycaller.com/2013/02/05/university-of-michigan-alle 
gedly-ejects-christian-group-in-the-name-of-tolerance/#ixzz2LXyPnqjy.  InterVarsity’s National 
Director commented that “The university  is  sending  the  message  that  religious  voices  are  
suspect  and  should  be marginalized. . . . I think it sends the message that the university does not 
understand the nature of religious beliefs and the convictions of religious students.”  Id. 
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address the issue of selective non-discrimination clauses and argues that 
stricter scrutiny must be applied to the university’s affirmative defense. 
I.  FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”25  
Protecting freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of association 
ensures an avenue for the advocacy of ideas in petitioning the government and 
marketing ideas in the public and private squares.26  Heightened application of 
First Amendment protection is crucial when the ideas expressed are 
inconsistent with majority and mainstream views—specifically those ideas that 
are controversial, divisive, or unorthodox.27  This protection is especially 
required in the university setting, which is the next generation’s “market place 
of ideas.”28 
                                                 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 26. See Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (“[T]he 
freedom to associate for the common advancement of political beliefs . . . necessarily presupposes 
the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to 
those people only.”); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658–61 (2000); Hurley 
v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995) (finding that state-
mandated inclusions of members in a private organization alters the expressive content of a 
group’s message); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (“An individual’s freedom 
to speak, to worship and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be 
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in 
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”). 
 27. Ryan C. Visser, Collision Course?: Christian Legal Society v. Kane Could Create a 
Split over the Right of Religious Student Groups to Associate in the Face of Law School 
Antidiscrimination Policies, 30 HAMLINE L. REV. 449, 461–62 (2007); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 
647–48 (stating that First Amendment rights are “crucial in preventing the majority from 
imposing its view on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular ideas”). 
 28. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (explaining 
that First Amendment rights extend to students within the “schoolhouse gate”); see also 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents for the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (noting 
that America’s future depends on its youth and their exposure to ideas in the classroom); Sweezy 
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (finding that to “impose any strait jacket upon the 
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation”); 
Jessica B. Lyons, Defining Freedom of the College Press After Hosty v. Carter, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1771, 1794 (2006) (arguing that “the need for a viable marketplace of ideas is the 
underlying principle of most First Amendment protections, both within the university and the 
greater community”); Mickey Lee Jett, Note, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of 
Tinker in the Age of Digital Social Media, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 895, 902 (2012) (highlighting the 
Court’s student speech jurisprudence post-Tinker). 
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A.  Defining the Limited Public Forum 
The constitutionality of constraining First Amendment freedoms depends on 
the type of forum that is restricted.29  In discussing the states’ ability to restrict 
a forum, it is essential to distinguish between traditional public forums and 
limited forums.30  Spaces that are used by the public to assemble and discuss 
public questions, such as streets, parks, and open spaces, are defined as 
traditional public forums.31  In a traditional public forum, the government is 
forbidden from engaging in viewpoint discrimination—defined as the 
preference of one message over another.32  Therefore, any restriction in the 
forum must be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government 
interest.33  Further, the Supreme Court has held that all ideas “having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, 
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full 
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the 
limited area of more important interests.”34 
In contrast to a traditional public forum, a limited public forum is an area 
typically not open for public use but used by a certain group or open for 
discussion of particular subjects.35  In a limited forum, the space has been 
opened for a specific purpose, and, therefore, the government may impose 
greater restrictions on its use.36  However, having established a forum’s 
                                                 
 29. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) 
(delineating the characteristic forums and the protections afforded in them). 
 30. See id.  
 31. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (discussing what constitutes a 
traditional public forum); Nathan W. Kellum, If It Looks Like a Duck . . . . Traditional Public 
Forum Status of Open Areas on Public University Campuses, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3–5 
(2005) (noting the traditional forum analysis derives from a seminal Supreme Court case from 
1939, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939)). 
 32. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 463 (1980).  When determining whether a State is acting 
within the set forum limits, a distinction is drawn between content discrimination and viewpoint 
discrimination.  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 819–20 (1995).  
Content discrimination, which limits speech because of its subject matter, is permissible only 
when it furthers the forum’s purpose.  Id.  Viewpoint discrimination, however, is presumed 
impermissible due to its restrictions on the speaker’s ideology, opinion, or perspective.  Id. 
 33. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (noting that 
the government may “exclude a speaker from a traditional public forum only when the exclusion 
is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that interest”); Carey, 447 U.S. at 464–65. 
 34. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (discussing how the protection of 
speech is paramount, even when discussing a criminal obscenity statute). 
 35. See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (“We have held 
that a government entity may create ‘a designated public forum’ if government property that has 
not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for that purpose.”); 
Kellum, supra note 31, at 6–7 (discussing the various types of restrictions that can be placed on a 
limited public forum). 
 36. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 542 (2009). 
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“openness,” the government must constrain any regulations of the forum 
within the boundaries it has set for itself.37 
A state university may create a limited forum for specific purposes, which 
can be limited to use by certain groups and for discussion of certain topics.38  
Because the space has a dedicated purpose, the state may impose restrictions 
on its use to foster the university’s purpose for creating the forum.39  Such a 
restriction is constitutional if it is “(1) reasonable in light of the purpose of the 
forum; and (2) viewpoint neutral.”40  Because the forum’s purpose limits the 
state’s ability to restrict speech, establishing the mission and boundaries of the 
university’s limited forum is essential.41  As a result, many of the cases 
involving a limited forum in a university setting center on how the university’s 
mission sets forth the forum’s boundaries. 
Unfortunately, the tension between students’ First Amendment freedoms and 
state universities’ educational interests is not new.  Over the past five decades, 
state universities have defended a variety of restrictive policies that sought to 
curtail abhorrent speech,42 abide by the Establishment Clause,43 prevent 
religious entanglement,44 or eradicate discrimination.45  The arguments 
addressing non-discrimination policies go to the heart of the tension between 
the First Amendment—which prohibits discrimination on the basis of what 
people  believe,  say,  congregate  to  discuss,  or  raise  with  public 
authorities—and the non-discrimination norms of the Fourteenth 
                                                 
 37. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (stating that a state can restrict speech in a limited 
forum only where the limitation furthers the limited forum’s purpose); see also Good News Club 
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001) (acknowledging that a state can limit a forum 
for certain groups or topics; however, viewpoint discrimination is impermissible and the 
restrictions must reasonably relate to forum’s purpose); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 46, 49 (1983) (recognizing that the government may not restrict 
speech on the basis of viewpoint). 
 38. See Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 470; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265–67 
(1981) (discussing a university’s decision to disallow a student organization from participating in 
religious worship and discussion on university property). 
 39. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 542.  Such restrictions must be viewpoint neutral 
and serve a rational purpose.  Id. 
 40. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988 (2010). 
 41. See Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2008) (analyzing an 
organization’s constitution to determine whether its restrictions were reasonable in light of the 
forum’s purpose), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Cty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010), 
as recognized in Stone v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Cntrs. Inc., 08-CV-1549-AJB WMC, 
2011 WL 5377638 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011). 
 42. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) (discussing a state college’s attempt to 
deny official recognition of a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society). 
 43. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270–71 (recalling the state university’s argument that offering 
its facilities to religiously-affiliated organizations would violate the Establishment Clause). 
 44. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 45. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2979 (outlining the University of California, Hastings 
College of Law’s “all-comers” policy). 
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Amendment.46  Therefore, it is not surprising that the courts have reached 
different conclusions on very similar facts.47 
B.  Established Prohibitions and Failed Affirmative Defenses for First 
Amendment Restrictions in a Limited Forum 
1.  Viewpoint Discrimination 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the First Amendment and the 
corresponding limits on a university’s restrictive policies began with the 
prohibition of viewpoint discrimination in Healy v. James.48  Healy addressed 
whether a state university could justify its official non-recognition of a student 
group based on the group’s philosophy.49  Central Connecticut State College, a 
state-supported school, denied official recognition of Students for a 
Democratic Society, stating that the group’s alleged philosophy of disruption 
and violence was in discord with university policy.50  The Supreme Court held 
that college officials may forbid a group from organizing where it poses a 
threat to campus safety regulations, but registration could not be denied based 
solely on the group’s abhorrent philosophy.51  The Court further held that a 
state university that denies official recognition of a student group to prevent 
disruption has the “heavy burden” of proving the restriction’s legitimacy.52 
                                                 
 46. See infra Part III. 
 47. Compare Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 (holding that an all-access non-discrimination 
policy is constitutional), with Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that a more narrow non-discrimination policy, which delineates specified areas of 
prohibited discrimination, is unconstitutional), and Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 
F.3d 790, 804–05 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a narrow non-discrimination policy, similar to the 
policy addressed in Walker, is constitutional and serves a compelling state interest), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012). 
 48. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 170–71, 187–88 (1972).  Today, it is well established that 
“the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it 
conveys.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828; see also Police Dep’t. of Chic. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
96 (1972) (holding that “the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content”).  The government 
must refrain from regulating speech based on viewpoint discrimination, “when the specific 
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 
restriction.”  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (1995). 
 49. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 187 (discussing the university’s claim that the organization’s 
philosophy was abhorrent). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 187–89 (holding that mere expression of an idea did not justify denial of First 
Amendment rights, and quoting Justice Hugo Black in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities 
Control Board as stating, “‘I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of 
speech, press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the 
ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish.’” (quoting 367 U.S. 1, 
137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting))). 
 52. Id. at 184 (characterizing the burden as “heavy”). 
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2.  Affirmative Defense: The Establishment Clause 
Widmar v. Vincent further expanded the scope of First Amendment rights in 
a limited forum.53  In Widmar, a religious student group brought suit after a 
state university denied the group recognition because of the religious content 
of its speech.54 
The university argued that it had a compelling and constitutional interest in 
the separation of church and state in compliance with the Establishment 
Clause.55  The Supreme Court held that a university policy providing for equal 
treatment of secular and religious campus groups does not offend the 
Establishment Clause if the policy has “a secular legislative purpose; . . . its 
principal or primary effect . . . neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; [and] 
the [policy] . . . [does not] foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with 
religion.’”56  According to the Court, a state’s interest in avoiding 
entanglement with the Establishment Clause within the limited forum, however 
valid, was not a compelling interest that justified content-based or viewpoint 
discrimination.57  The Court ultimately held that once a school has created a 
limited forum that is open to student groups, any exclusion from—or 
regulations within—that forum must be content-neutral.58  Against that 
standard, the university was unable to justify the group’s exclusion on 
constitutional grounds.59 
3.  Affirmative Defense: Religious Disentanglement 
Despite the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and assurance that 
equal access for religious groups does not violate the Establishment Clause,60 
                                                 
 53. 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see Paulsen, supra note 3, at 655 (discussing Widmar’s holding). 
 54. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264–65. The student group had previously registered as a student 
organization.  Id. at 265. 
 55. Id. at 270; see also U.S. CONST, amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion”). 
 56. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274–77 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 
(1971)).  The Establishment Clause protects from “‘sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”  Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. 
Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). 
 57. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276. 
 58. Id. at 277. 
 59. Id. 
 60. In 1984, Congress utilized the Equal Access Act to address the Establishment Clause 
issue discussed by the Supreme Court in Widmar.  20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1984).  Under the Equal 
Access Act, Congress declared that if a public secondary school created a limited forum that 
students were allowed to associate, it was then prohibited from discriminating against students on 
the basis of “religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech.”  § 4071(a), (b).  A 
“limited open forum” exists whenever a public secondary school “grants an offering to or 
opportunity for one or more non-curriculum related student groups to meet on school premises 
during non-instructional time.”  § 4071(b).  Through the Equal Access Act, the Court provided 
protection and rights for secondary school students to engage in religious speech, debate, and 
association within public schools’ limited forum.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. 
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First Amendment issues in the limited forum continued to be contentious.61  In 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the Court again 
addressed the issue of discrimination against a religious group within a limited 
forum of the university setting.62  In Rosenberger, a student-run newspaper, 
Wide Awake Productions, was denied payments for printing because of the 
newspaper’s religious perspective.63  The university argued that the paper’s 
Christian perspective, by “promot[ing] or manifest[ing] a particular belie[f] in 
or about a deity or an ultimate reality,” violated the university’s Student 
Activities Fund guidelines.64 
The students filed suit, arguing that withholding payment owed to the 
newspaper violated the students’ First Amendment rights.65  The university 
claimed that within a limited public forum, the school has the ability and duty 
to confine a forum to legitimate purposes that further its educational mission.66  
While acknowledging that the university could constitutionally define its 
mission, the Court held that the viewpoint discrimination in this case was 
unconstitutional.67  The Court found that when a university treats religiously 
                                                                                                                 
v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (holding that the Equal Access Act was intended to forbid 
discrimination against a student group on the basis of religion and that the Act did not violate the 
Establishment Clause).   The Act provides that 
“It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial 
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair 
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting 
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or 
other content of the speech at such meetings.” 
§ 4071(b). 
 61. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822–23 
(1995) (challenging a university’s denial of funds to a student Christian newspaper). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 822–23, 825. 
 64. Id. at 822–23, 827.  Guidelines stated that the Student Activities Fund should be used to 
support extracurricular activities that are “related to the educational purpose of the University,” 
including publications related to “student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic 
communications media groups.”  Id. at 824.  Activities not reimbursed by the Fund included 
“religious activities, philanthropic contributions and activities, political activities, activities that 
would jeopardize the University’s tax-exempt status, those which involve payment of honoraria 
or similar fees, or social entertainment or related expenses.”  Id. at 825.  Although both parties 
agreed that the student newspaper, Wide Awake Productions, was not a “religious organization,”  
the University argued that they were engaged in “religious activities.” Id. at 826–27. 
 65. Id. at 827. 
 66. Id. at 833.  This was a case of viewpoint discrimination because of the focus on the 
students’ specific motivating ideology.  Id. at 832. 
 67. Id. at 834 (finding that the University engaged in viewpoint discrimination in 
withholding funding); see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. 
of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3007 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the 
majority’s emphasis on funding and noting that First Amendment rights are more than just a 
matter of funding because, “[t]o university students, the campus is their world. The right to meet 
on campus and use campus channels of communication is at least as important to university 
students as the right to gather on the town square and use local communication forums is to the 
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affiliated organizations differently, even within a limited forum, the 
university’s unconstitutional acts are not protected by furthering an educational 
mission.68 
C.  Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: A Primer on Limited Public Forum 
and Non-Discrimination 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez presents the most recent Supreme Court 
analysis of the tension between First Amendment rights within a university’s 
limited forum and non-discrimination policies.69  Martinez arose out of a claim 
brought by the Christian Legal Society (CLS), a student group at the 
University of California, Hastings College of Law (Hastings), which was 
denied official recognition because of its bylaws.70  To receive official 
recognition, Hastings required student groups to be non-commercial, to limit 
membership to Hastings students, to submit bylaws to Hastings for approval, 
and to comply with Hastings’ “Policies and Regulations Applying to College 
Activities, Organization and Students.”71  The Christian student organization, 
out of which CLS formed, operated as a Registered Student Organization 
(RSO) for over a decade.72  However, in 2004,  CLS’s application was 
denied.73  Hastings told CLS that the organization’s policy that required voting 
members and leaders to sign a Statement of Faith74 failed to comply with the 
school’s non-discrimination policy.75  As a result, CLS was denied the benefits 
                                                                                                                 
citizen”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 795, 859 n.211 (1993) 
(arguing that providing funding to religious student groups is equivalent to the financial subsidy 
of providing access to school facilities). 
 68. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833–34 (distinguishing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 
(1981), and noting that “viewpoint-based restrictions are [not] proper when the University does 
not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to 
encourage a diversity of views from private speakers”).  It is important to note that Rosenberger 
addressed student speech—not the government’s ability to control its own expression.  Compare 
id. at 834, with Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262–63 (1988) (finding that a 
student newspaper published by the district, with district funds, involved the government’s right 
to control the content of its own expression). 
 69. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010). 
 70. Id. at 2979–80 (detailing CLS’s exclusion of students based on religion and sexual 
orientation).  At Hastings, student groups apply to become registered student organizations 
(RSO), a status that provides certain benefits, including receiving financial assistance from 
student activity fees, communicating though Hastings’ weekly newsletter, advertising on school 
bulletin boards, participating in an annual RSO fair, and using Hastings’ name and logo.  Id. 
 71. Id. at 2979.  If a group wishes to use the school’s name or logo, the group must sign a 
license agreement.  Id. 
 72. Id. at 2980. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  The Statement of Faith affirms fundamental Christian doctrines.  Id. at 3001.  Such 
beliefs include the idea that the Bible is God’s word and that “acts of sexual conduct outside of 
God’s design for marriage between one man and one woman” are a sin.  Id. 
 75. Id. at 2979–80.  The school’s policy states that “[Hastings] shall not discriminate 
unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or 
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of a RSO, including a financial subsidy and an effective means of 
communicating with the larger student body.76 
1.  Defining the Limited Public Forum Mission in Martinez 
CLS  filed  suit  against  Hastings,  challenging  the  constitutionality  of  an  
“all-access” non-discrimination policy restriction on student groups.77  The 
Supreme Court evaluated the legitimacy of an “all-access” non-discrimination 
policy applied to student groups by analyzing how the restriction serves the 
purposes of Hastings’ limited forum.78  Hastings argued that its limited forum 
was defined not only by its educational mission, but also by an effort to create 
“opportunities to pursue academic and social interests outside of the classroom 
[to] further . . . develo[p] leadership skills.”79  Hastings advocated that RSOs 
are a means to achieving this mission80 and that their policy “ensure[d] that the 
leadership, educational, and social opportunities afforded by [RSOs] are 
available to all students.”81  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Hastings, 
                                                                                                                 
sexual orientation. This nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access and treatment in 
Hastings-sponsored programs and activities.”  Id. at 2979. 
 76. See supra note 70 (explaining the benefits of a student organization).  Hastings argued 
that denial of these benefits was simply “dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of 
prohibition.”  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2975.   The issue of funding and benefits in this factual 
scenario, under the Spending Clause, is outside the scope of this Note.  For more information, see 
Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–8 (1988) (explaining that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine precludes 
the government from coercing the subject into waiving a constitutional right); Joan W. Howarth, 
Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 889, 919 
(2009) (arguing that portraying student group recognition as a subsidy undervalues their 
expressive interests); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1413, 1415 (1989) (arguing that “the government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the 
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit 
altogether”). 
 77. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2981. 
 78. Id. at 2978–79 (characterizing the school’s interest as promotion of education and 
leadership development). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  Hastings argued that the “all-access” policy (1) ensures that opportunities are 
available to everyone; (2) helps police the policy without requiring the school to determine an 
RSO’s reason for determination; (3) encourages tolerance, cooperation, and student learning; and 
(4) conveys the school’s compliance with state-law non-discrimination policies.  Hastings 
registers around 60 RSOs a year to further their legal educational mission and bring together 
“individuals with diverse backgrounds and beliefs” to better “encourage tolerance, cooperation, 
and learning among students.”  Id. at 2990. 
 81. Id. at 2989; see Prospective Students, Learn About Our Students, UCLA SCHOOL OF 
LAW, http://www.law.ucla.edu/prospective-students/learn-about-our-students/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2013).  In 2008, the Supreme Court held that a non-discrimination policy was 
reasonable in light of the school’s interest in “developing good citizenship, [promoting] 
harmonious relationships . . . [and] developing a regard for law and order.”  Truth v. Kent Sch. 
Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Cty. v. Humphries, 
131 S. Ct. 447 (2010), as recognized in Stone v. Advance Am., Cash Advance Cntrs. Inc., 08-
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holding that an “all-access” non-discrimination policy is viewpoint neutral and 
a valid restriction within a limited forum.82 
2.  “All-Access” Approval: The True Holding of Martinez 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez, many expressed deep 
concerns about the future of First Amendment rights in the university setting.83  
Martinez’s holding, however, is quite narrow:84 a non-discrimination policy, 
which is neutral and generally applicable, mandating that student groups accept 
all eligible students as voting members is constitutional.85 The Supreme Court 
in Martinez held that an “all-comers policy” could legitimately promote 
Hastings’ educational mission.86  The Court, however, reiterated that a 
university may not engage in viewpoint discrimination.87  The majority 
concluded that, “so long as a public university does not contravene 
constitutional limits, its choice to advance state-law goals [of non-
discrimination] through the school’s educational endeavors stands on firm 
footing.”88 
Therefore, Martinez does not address the constitutionality of a selective  
non-discrimination policy that prohibits discrimination based on certain 
categories  within  a  limited  forum.89   Instead,  the  case  only  addresses  an 
                                                                                                                 
CV-1549-AJB WMC, 2011 WL 5377638 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011); see infra note 117 (discussing 
Truth v. Kent). 
 82. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995. 
 83. See, e.g., Thro & Russo, supra note 18, at 474  (citing Editorial, The Supreme Court’s 
“Subsidies”, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at A18) (noting that schools often, under the guise of 
non-discrimination policies, suppress unpopular groups and views). 
 84. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 2978 (majority opinion). 
 86. Id. at 2995. 
 87. Id. at 2991 (stating that viewpoint-neutral barriers do not prohibit the group’s access to 
other available avenues through which it may exercise its First Amendment rights, thus lessening 
the burden created by any viewpoint-neutral restrictions). 
 88. Id. at 2990–91.  This Note does not argue, or address whether Martinez was correctly 
decided.  However, many commentators have argued that Martinez’s holding fundamentally 
contradicts other First Amendment jurisprudence found in Healy and Widmar.  See e.g., Chapin 
Cimino, Campus Citizenship and Associational Freedom: An Aristotelian Take on the 
Nondiscrimination Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 535–37 (2011) (arguing that “the 
Court was closer to getting it right the first time” when it considered “student’s associational 
rights” in Healy). 
 89. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3002 (Alito, J., dissenting).  It was left to determine on remand 
whether the all-access non-discrimination policy, which was determined to be constitutional if 
applied to all student groups, was in fact applied in a neutral fashion.  Id. at 2995 (majority 
opinion).  CLS tried to argue that under Hastings’ policy, a political group could “insist that its 
leaders support its purposes and beliefs . . . but a religious group cannot.”  Id. at 2982.  However, 
the Court did not address this issue and stated that “CLS’s assertion runs headlong into the 
stipulation of facts it jointly submitted.” Id. 
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all-access, all-comers policy.90  The Court underscored that Hastings’ policy 
“‘is justified without reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the regulated 
speech.’”91  Acknowledging that viewpoint neutrality is the “sticking point” in 
limited forum analysis, the majority highlighted that it is “hard to imagine a 
more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept 
all comers.”92  In contrast to other limited public forum cases like Healy, 
Widmar, and Rosenberger, Hastings’ all-comers policy did not draw a 
distinction between groups, and was, therefore, “textbook viewpoint neutral.”93 
The  dissent  in  Martinez  focused  on  the  discrepancies  between  
Hastings’   all-access   policy  and   the   actual   language   of   Hastings’   
non-discrimination policy as applied when it denied CLS’s registration.94  
Looking beyond the facial neutrality and authenticity issue of the all-access 
policy, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia 
and Clarence Thomas questioned Hastings’ motivation in establishing such a 
non-discrimination policy.95  The dissenters criticized the majority for ignoring 
evidence that Hastings policy was not viewpoint neutral and, as a result, gave 
public universities a weapon to suppress unpopular speech.96 
                                                 
 90. See Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. at 2982, 2984) (acknowledging that the Martinez court declined to extend its 
holding to narrower non-discrimination policies, such as those that prohibited membership 
requirements on the basis of race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 1743 (2012). 
 91. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)). 
 92. Id. at 2993. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Overwhelming evidence, however, shows that 
Hastings  denied  CLS’s  application  pursuant  to  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy  and  that  the 
accept-all-comers policy was nowhere to be found until it was mentioned by a former dean in a 
deposition taken well after this case began.”). 
 95. Id. at 3004.  The dissent noted that, until the all-comers policy was unveiled, Hastings 
registered numerous student organizations that restricted membership and leadership to 
individuals who agreed with the group message.  Id.  For example, since student groups were 
required to submit a copy of their bylaws, Hastings knew that the Hastings Democratic Caucus 
required that its members respect the organization’s objective.  Similarly, Silenced Right limited 
voting membership to students who advocated a pro-life message, and La Raza limited voting 
membership to students of Hispanic background. 
 96. Id. at 3001; see Adam Liptak, Club that Discriminates Loses Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 2010, at A18 (suggesting that the majority left open the possibility that CLS could eventually 
prove that Hastings’ policy was “a pretext for antireligious animus”); see also CLS Brief, supra 
note 9, at 17 (“If Martinez is correct, however, all that the campus officials in Healy needed to do 
to keep the SDS off campus was to adopt a uniform policy restricting all campus student groups’ 
freedom of expressive association.  Under Martinez—quite contrary to Healy—a state university 
apparently may restrict speech and association and does have power to ‘burden’ or ‘abridge’ the 
‘associational right’ of student groups ‘to associate to further their personal beliefs.’  All that is 
required is that a university impose ‘neutral,’ across-the-board restrictions on all groups’ 
expressive association.”). 
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D.  The Seventh Circuit Addresses What Martinez Did Not 
The Supreme Court’s limited holding in Martinez left unanswered questions 
about the constitutionality of a selective non-discrimination policy that relates 
to a university’s mission.  However, in 2006, four years before the Supreme 
Court decided Martinez, the Seventh Circuit in Christian Legal Society v. 
Walker addressed and invalidated a selective non-discrimination policy that 
prohibited a Christian student organization from restricting its membership.97 
In Walker, Christian Legal Society (CLS) brought an action against Southern 
Illinois University’s School of Law (SIU) for denying it RSO-recognition on 
account of the organization’s Statement of Faith, which required voting 
members and officers to abide by specific moral principles.98  The university 
rejected CLS’s application, arguing that it violated state non-discrimination 
laws as well as the school’s nondiscrimination policy.99  The university also 
argued that CLS’s sexual abstinence requirement, which was part of the 
Statement of Faith, violated the school’s non-discrimination policy.100  
Because of the school’s rejection, CLS was stripped of the benefits reserved 
for officially recognized student groups.101 
CLS sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the university violated its 
First Amendment and due process rights.102  The district court held that CLS 
“had not suffered irreparable harm,” and therefore CLS failed to show 
potentially successful First Amendment claims.103  The Seventh Circuit 
disagreed, reasoning that CLS demonstrated a likelihood that the university 
unconstitutionally infringed its right of expressive association and freedom of 
speech by denying the group RSO-status.104  Acknowledging that the 
government can override the right of expressive association only in areas that 
                                                 
 97. 453 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 98. Walker, 453 F.3d at 857–58.  CLS’s Statement of Faith reads: “CLS welcomes anyone 
to its meetings, but voting members and officers of the organization must subscribe to the 
statement of faith, meaning, among other things, that they must not engage in or approve of 
fornication, adultery, or homosexual conduct; or, having done so, must repent of that conduct.”  
Id. at 858.  A person’s past sexual conduct or homosexual inclinations did not preclude eligibility 
for membership or candidacy for an officer position.  Id. at 859. 
 99. Id. at 858. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  at  857–58  (noting  that  some  of  these  benefits  included  access  to  the  law 
school List-Serve and bulletin boards, representation on the school’s website, support of an 
official faculty advisor, recognition as a student organization, ability to reserve conference rooms, 
and funding from student fees). 
 102. Id. at 857. 
 103. Id. at 858–59. 
 104. Id. at 859–60.  The court also found that it was unclear whether CLS violated any SIU 
policy, which was SIU’s justification for revoking CLS’s status as registered student 
organization.   Id.  At  861  (finding  a  clear  interference  with  an  organization  where  the 
“regulation . . . forces the group to accept members it does not desire”).  Freedom to associate 
“plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.”  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 
(1984). 
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serve a compelling state interest, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
university’s actions failed to reach the mark.105  The Seventh Circuit held that 
the university had no compelling interest in requiring CLS to accept members 
whose conduct violated their Statement of Faith beyond “eradicating or 
neutralizing particular beliefs contained in [CLS’] creed.”106 
II.  ALPHA DELTA: THE NINTH CIRCUIT TACKLES SELECTIVE  
NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed 
addressed the constitutionality of a policy very similar to the policy in Walker.  
However, despite their factual similarities, the two circuits’ holdings 
conflict.107 
In Alpha Delta, a Christian sorority and fraternity brought suit alleging that 
San Diego State University violated the organizations’ First Amendment rights 
when the university rejected their application for official registration as student 
organizations.108  Like other state universities, San Diego State is a limited 
public forum, defined by its educational mission and forum rules.109  San 
Diego State’s Student Handbook declares that the educational mission includes 
a commitment to diversity and encourages students to promote “ideals of 
respect, equality, diversity and freedom from harassment.”110  San Diego 
State’s rejection of Alpha Delta’s application was not an isolated 
occurrence.111  In fact, the university repeatedly denied the organization’s 
application to become an RSO.112 
                                                 
 105. Walker, 453 F.3d at 863. 
 106. Id. (finding that the point of the policy was to force the group to modify its message). 
 107. 648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012) (concluding that 
the non-discrimination policy was “viewpoint neutral and reasonable”); Walker, 453 F.3d at 858 
(holding that there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the policy would be unconstitutional). 
 108. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 795–96.  The requirements for membership in the sorority, 
Alpha Delta Chi, include acceptance of Jesus Christ, church attendance, and participation in 
Christian service.  Id. at 795.  The fraternity, Alpha Gamma Omega, requires members to accept 
Jesus Christ, and requires officers to sign a statement that reads: 
I hearby publicly confess my belief in the Lord Jesus Christ as God and only Savior and 
give witness to the regenerating power of the Holy Spirit in my life. I will make it a 
purpose of my life to continue in fellowship with God through prayer and reading of 
the Holy Scriptures. 
Id. 
 109. See id. at 798 (identifying university programs that limit membership to certain groups 
and require university approval as “hallmark[s] of a limited public forum” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 110. Id. at 798–99. 
 111. Id. at 795. 
 112. Id. at 796.  San Diego had approximately 115 RSOs.  Id. Recognition benefits include 
university funding, use of university name and logo, use of university facilities, publicity, and 
participation in school events.  Id. at 795–96. 
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The university denied the applications because of the group’s membership 
and officer requirements, which required a belief in Christianity.113  San Diego 
State alleged that requiring affirmation of religious belief for membership and 
leadership in a student group violated its non-discrimination policy.114  After 
the university denied the group official recognition, the plaintiffs challenged 
San Diego State’s non-discrimination policy under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.115  The district court granted summary judgment for San Diego 
State, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.116 
Looking to its limited public forum jurisprudence,117 the Ninth Circuit 
accepted the limited forum’s purpose as defined by the student handbook’s 
program guidelines.118  San Diego State’s Student Handbook declares that the 
educational mission includes: 
                                                 
 113. Id. at 796. 
 114. Id.  The full policy states: 
On-campus status will not be granted to any student organization whose application is 
incomplete or restricts membership or eligibility to hold appointed or elected student 
officer positions in the campus-recognized chapter or group on the basis of race, sex, 
color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, physical or 
mental handicap, ancestry, or medical condition, except as explicitly exempted under 
federal law. 
Id. 
This policy mirrors the California State University Non-Discrimination Regulation, which states: 
No campus shall recognize any fraternity, sorority, living group, honor society, or other 
student organization, which discriminates on the basis of race, religion, national origin, 
ethnicity, color, age, gender, marital status, citizenship, sexual orientation, or disability. 
The prohibition on membership policies that discriminate on the basis of gender does 
not apply to social fraternities or sororities or to other university living groups. 
5 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 5, § 41500 (2012). 
 115. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 796.  Even without official recognition, student groups may 
recruit new members by handing out flyers and posting signs in areas open to all groups.  Id.  But, 
plaintiffs must pay for access to university rooms for meetings and events, which officially 
recognized groups may use for free.  Id. 
 116. Id. at 795–96. 
 117. Id. at 798–99.  In Alpha Delta, the court’s discussion of the forum’s “purpose” relied on 
the court’s analysis and decision in Truth v. Kent School District, 542 F.3d 634 (9th Cir.2008).  In 
Truth, the Court looked to the program’s own constitution to determine if the non-discrimination 
policy was reasonable with respect to the forum’s purpose.  Truth, 542 F.3d at 649.  The Kent 
School District’s constitution listed developing good citizenship, promoting harmonious 
relationships, facilitating student and faculty expression, and encouraging students to obey, honor, 
and sustain state and local laws and school rules as the foundational principles guiding its 
purpose.  Id.  The court in Truth interpreted the non-discrimination policy as advancing these 
broad statements and the “school’s basic pedagogical goals,” instilling “‘shared values of a 
civilized social order’ . . . includ[ing] instilling the value of non-discrimination.” Id. 
(quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)). The court in Truth 
therefore concluded that the non-discrimination policy was a reasonable limitation in light of the 
purpose of the student organization forum.  Id. 
 118. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 798–99. 
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positive commitment toward diversity. . . . We encourage every 
student organization to make a conscious effort to undertake 
recruitment efforts to ensure diversity within the group’s 
membership and to take steps to reach populations currently 
underrepresented.   .   .   .   No   organization   will   direct  
recruitment . . . toward any one group (i.e. racial, ethnic, gender, etc.) 
of potential members. . . . We . . . challenge you to express yourself 
in a manner that promotes and maintains the ideals of respect, 
equality, diversity, and freedom from harassment.119 
The court concluded from the mission statement that the essential purpose of 
the forum was to promote diversity; therefore, the Court found that requiring 
RSOs to comply with a non-discrimination policy was reasonable.120 
On the issue of viewpoint neutrality, the Ninth Circuit held that the policy 
did not violate the Constitution’s Free Exercise or Equal Protection Clauses 
because the policy, as written, is a “rule of general application” that does not 
specifically target or burden religious groups.121  As a matter of school policy 
and practice, however, student groups apparently may limit membership to 
those who agree with the club’s purpose, ideology, or mission.122   Therefore, 
the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether San Diego 
State had applied the policy evenly to all student groups.123  Alpha Delta 
subsequently submitted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court asking 
the Court to clarify whether the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses prevent 
state universities from discriminating against religiously affiliated student 
organizations based on the religious nature of their association and speech.124  
The Court denied the petition.125 
                                                 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 799. 
 121. Id. at 804. 
 122. Id.   at   803–04   (pointing   to   other   instances   of   inconsistency   in   applying   the   
non-discrimination policy); see also CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 7–8 (noting that the Lebanese 
Club limits membership to students willing to work toward an independent Lebanon, the 
Immigration Rights Coalition requires members to share their beliefs regarding immigrant rights, 
and the Voices of Planned Parenthood limits membership to those committed to reproductive 
freedom).  There is little distinction between permitting students to require agreement with the 
particular ideology, belief, or philosophy, and forbidding groups from requiring affirmation of 
religious belief.  See infra notes 149–53 and accompanying text. 
 123. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 804. 
 124. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alpha Delta, 123 S. Ct. 1743 (No. 11-744).  Although the 
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in this case, this Note argues that the issue is still ripe 
for Supreme Court review. 
 125. Alpha Delta, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012) (denying certiorari). 
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III.  HOW SELECTIVE NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES ARE BROADLY 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Although Martinez finds “all-access” policies constitutionally permissible,126 
the Alpha Delta decision strikes far beyond Martinez’s holding.127  By 
applying a low standard of review to a selective non-discrimination policy that 
prohibits an organization from restricting membership on the “basis of race, 
sex, color, age, religion, national origin, marital status, sexual orientation, 
physical or mental handicap, ancestry, or medical condition,” the Ninth Circuit 
essentially permitted viewpoint-based discrimination.128  The court’s “hear no 
evil, see no evil, speak no evil” approach failed to inquire beyond the facial 
validity of the school’s affirmative defense.129  By accepting San Diego State’s 
articulation of its interest in promoting a non-discrimination policy, the Ninth 
Circuit overlooked significant constitutional questions.130 
A.  A Lack of Scrutiny: The Questions Raised by Alpha Delta 
The important factual development for First Amendment cases within a 
limited forum lies in the determination of a policy’s viewpoint neutrality and 
reasonability,131 not only “as written” but also “as applied.”132  The Ninth 
Circuit noted that San Diego State’s policy “as written” did not focus on 
religious beliefs or contain restrictions that targeted religious organizations.133  
However, whether a policy targets or imposes unique requirements is a factual 
                                                 
 126. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2993 (2010); WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION at 516–20 (3d ed. 1995) (arguing that there is no obligation for a university 
to create a limited public forum recognizing, supporting, or funding student groups, but if that 
choice is made, all student groups must be treated the same). 
 127. See text accompanying supra notes 84–85. 
 128. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 797.  Looking to Martinez, the Ninth Circuit in Alpha Delta 
found no material distinctions between Hastings’ and San Diego State’s RSO programs.  Id.  In 
addressing  the  purposes  of  the  limited  forum,  the  court  concluded  that  San  Diego  State’s 
non-discrimination policy was reasonable to promote diversity because the RSOs still had access 
to the school’s resources and could recruit members.  Id. at 798–99. 
 129. Id. at 803–04. 
 130. See id. at 805–06 (Ripple, J., concurring) (noting that “it is still an open question at the 
national level”).  The Ninth Circuit did not address how the university defines “diversity,”  or, 
more importantly, why the same non-discrimination rules do not apply to other “ideological” 
organizations.    These   factual   questions   should   be   developed   before   declaring   the   
non-discrimination policy viewpoint neutral, both as written and as applied. 
 131. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2988 (beginning its analysis with the non-discrimination 
policy’s reasonableness in view of the forum’s purpose). 
 132. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 883 (1995) 
(remanding to determine whether the facially neutral program was in fact neutral in application); 
Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that, although a 
policy was facially neutral, there was strong evidence that the policy was not neutral as applied). 
 133. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 804 (stating any burden to be “incidental”). 
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question, not a legal determination.134  It is evident that San Diego State 
students can limit membership based on adherence to the group’s mission.135  
Yet, student groups motivated by an ideology or religious purpose may not 
limit their membership or leadership.136  The question of whether any burden 
created by the policy’s application falls on religious groups is also a factual 
question that the courts should not dismiss lightly.137 
Examining the school’s non-discrimination policy “as applied” requires, 
first, determining how San Diego State understands its purpose and, second, 
questioning how the policy fits this purpose.138  Ironically, within the past two 
decades, select universities, including the University of California at Los 
Angeles (UCLA), have argued that their non-discrimination policies should be 
subsumed by an interest in promoting student-body diversity.139  One such 
argument was central in Grutter v. Bollinger, a case in which the University of 
Michigan Law School, when sued over admissions policies that granted 
preferences to under-represented minorities,140 asked the Court to recognize 
that “in the context of higher education [there is] a compelling state interest in 
student body diversity.”141  Similarly, in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, the Court applied a similar rationale when the University 
was sued over its admissions policies, which considered race and gender in the 
                                                 
 134. Id. at 803. 
 135. CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 7 (distinguishing Alpha Delta from Martinez). 
 136. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 796; see also CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 8 (arguing that this is 
the exception to the general rule that student groups may limit membership and leadership to 
students who agree with the group’s ideology or purpose “as a whole”). 
 137. See Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 804 (stating that the plaintiffs may have mischaracterized 
the evidence).  The Ninth Circuit accepted San Deigo State’s assertion that they did not intend to 
suppress religious speech and association.  Id.  Even in Martinez, the Court remanded to 
determine how the facially viewpoint neutral policy was actually applied, noting that CLS had a 
strong argument because even under the lowest level of scrutiny, it was clear that CLS alone was 
singled out.  See Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The Constitutional Rights of Politically 
Incorrect  Groups:  Christian  Legal  Society  v.  Walker  As  an  Illustration,  33  J.C.  &  U.L. 
361, 368–69 (2007). 
 138. See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (explaining that a limited forum is an 
area that is narrowly tailored for use by certain groups dedicated solely to select subjects). 
 139. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–28 (2003) (rejecting the notion that only 
remedying past discrimination can provide a permissible justification for a race-based admissions 
policy); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (acknowledging the 
University’s argument that its admission policy takes race into account in order to achieve its 
stated mission of a diverse student body). 
 140. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316–18 (proving an explanation by the director of the law school’s 
admissions process that there was no target percentage to achieve sufficient representation by the 
“underrepresented”).  Petitioner, Barbara Grutter, was a white Michigan resident seeking 
admission to the Law School.  Id. at 316–17.  Grutter sued the University of Michigan Law 
School for allegedly discriminating against her based on race because of the University’s policy 
to attain a certain number of minority groups.  Id. 
 141. Id. at 328. 
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admission process.142  Furthermore, the university alleged that the close 
relationship between its educational mission and the compelling state interest 
in   institutional   diversity   should   take   precedence   over   the  f orum’s  
non-discrimination rules.143   The university’s law school even submitted an 
amicus brief arguing that “diversity serves a special function in education, to 
prepare students for life in a pluralistic society” and that in “legal education, 
built upon dialogue, debate, and the clash of conflicting opinion, diversity 
makes a unique contribution to the education of all students, majority and 
minority alike.”144  The Supreme Court held in favor of the universities in both 
Grutter and Bakke, recognizing the corollary between the educational mission 
and the universities’ interest in ensuring diversity within the student body.145 
For universities that actively “manage” diversity, important questions must 
be asked: How does the university define “diversity”?  Why do non-
discrimination rules apply differently to certain ideological organizations?146  
With such a pervasive interest in promoting diversity within the student body, 
it is essential to question how diversity is defined.147  Only the facts will 
disclose if the forum has been constructed in a manner designed to target 
certain viewpoints and privilege others.148 
                                                 
 142. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12.  Respondent, Allan Bakke, a white male, sued the 
University of California, Davis Medical School after being rejected multiple times, claiming that 
it was due to a racial and ethnic quota policy.  Id. at 276–78. 
 143. Id. at 313. 
 144. Brief for the Law School Admission Council as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
54,  Bakke,  438  U.S.  265  (No.  76-811);  see  also  Swann  v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (suggesting that to adequately prepare students to live in a pluralist 
society, a ratio reflecting the proportion within the relevant school district is necessary); Sweatt v. 
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (explaining that a law school that only admits African 
Americans creates inequality because it excludes substantial portions of racial groups that, when 
brought together in the same classroom, generate an exchange of ideas and further enhance the 
learning of the law). 
 145. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–28 (holding that the use of race in the admissions process 
forms a compelling state interest because of the educational benefits stemming from a diverse 
student body); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (holding that attaining a diverse student body 
is constitutionally permissible for an institution of higher education). 
 146. For  example:  Democrats,  Republicans,  Vegans,  and  Meat-Lovers.   See  Alpha  
Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 2011) (Ripple, J., concurring) 
(noting that Vegan students can restrict members to Vegans and still receive official recognition), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012). 
 147. See Julie F. Mead, Conscious Use of Race as a Voluntary Means to Educational Ends in 
Elementary and Secondary Education: A Legal Argument Derived from Recent Judicial 
Decisions, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 63, 112 (2002) (explaining that the school’s definition of 
diversity is essential because diversity is a factor in a court’s narrow tailoring analysis).  For 
example, Martinez rested on the premise that a university must not only adopt a true “all-comers” 
policy, but also apply that policy uniformly.  Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994–95. 
 148. The forum’s message raises important questions that require additional facts.  If, for 
instance, the message conveyed by the university’s official action is that some religious 
viewpoints are inconsistent with diversity and civil rights, that message raises Establishment 
Clause issues.  See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing how equal treatment of student groups does not 
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What is clear from the concurring opinion in Alpha Delta is that the selective 
non-discrimination policy is plainly not viewpoint neutral.149  The explicit 
language used in selective non-discrimination policies dictates specifically 
which groups are not permitted to draw distinctions.150  Religiously affiliated 
organizations, in particular, face unique challenges in exercising their freedom 
of speech, freedom of religion, and freedom of expressive association within 
the university’s non-discrimination requirements.151  Vegans are permitted to 
require their leadership to adhere to particular norms and conduct of a vegan 
lifestyle, but a Jewish organization would be forbidden from requiring belief in 
the Jewish faith in order to officially lead the association.152  The rationale for 
not wanting a Republican to lead a Democratic student organization, or even 
become a voting member, is the same rationale that applies to religious 
organizations—when the membership or leadership does not adhere to the 
group’s stated mission and expressive message, the message is compromised, 
                                                                                                                 
violate the Establishment Clause generally, and that within a limited forum any regulations 
imposed on student groups must be content neutral); see also Andrew D. Brown, Do As I Say, Not 
As I Do: The Myth of Neutrality in Nondiscrimination Policies at Public Universities, 91 N.C. L. 
REV. 280, 304 (2012) (arguing that the failure to apply appropriate judicial scrutiny to the 
constitutional validity of the restrictive measures disproportionately burdens religious groups and 
is unacceptable given the rights at stake); Chapin Cimino, Campus Citizenship and Associational 
Freedom: An Aristotelian Take on the Nondiscrimination Puzzle, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
533, 553, 566 (2011) (arguing that restrictions on the right of expressive association should be 
able to survive a strict scrutiny test and that a lower standard actually favors government 
restriction, which is inappropriate in the context of protecting expressive student association); 
Kara R. Moheban, Case Comment, Establishment Clause Does Not Compel  University  to  Deny  
Funding  to  Religious  Student  Publications–Rosenberger  v.  Rector & Visitors of University of 
Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995), 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 237, 242 (1996) (stating that the 
Establishment Clause does not require a complete separation of church and state; instead, the state 
must use neutral criteria and policies when providing benefits to recipients). 
 149. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 805 (Ripple, J., concurring) (arguing that Alpha Delta is not 
controlled by Martinez, as the school’s non-discrimination policy is not an “all-comers” policy, 
but rather prohibits discrimination of specified groups). 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 144.  Such policies not only impact religious 
organizations, but also affects groups formed around certain cultures or ethnic backgrounds.  The 
policies dilute the organization’s unique cultural identity, which ultimately fosters diversity for 
the university campus. 
 151. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(discussing a university policy that provides for equal treatment without regard to sexual 
orientation, but noting that homosexual conduct conflicts with some religious organizations’ 
beliefs).  See generally Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Groups Autonomy: Further Reflections 
About What Is at Stake, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 153 (2006) (defending the autonomy of religious 
organizations and groups because they are a source of alternative ideas for our society and our 
laws). 
 152. See, e.g., Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010–11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“An environmentalist 
group was not required to admit students who rejected global warming. An animal rights group 
was not obligated to accept students who supported the use of animals to test cosmetics. But CLS 
was required to admit avowed atheists. This was patent viewpoint discrimination.”); Alpha Delta, 
648 F.3d at 805 (discussing the lack of restrictions on Vegan student organizations that limit 
membership). 
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the purpose of the association is thwarted, and the associational beliefs are 
internally challenged.153 
It is important that selective non-discrimination policies clearly define which 
types of organizations can limit student membership.  While groups with no 
expressive association have no right to discriminate, as there is no message to 
be compromised by the inclusion of individuals with certain beliefs, the same 
is not true for expressive associational groups, such as religiously affiliated 
organizations.154  As Justice Alito highlighted in Martinez, “of course there is a 
strong interest in prohibiting religious discrimination where religion is 
irrelevant.  But it is fundamentally confused to apply a rule against religious 
discrimination to a religious association.”155  It is universally understood that, 
at a minimum, the Free Exercise Clause forbids the government from 
discriminating against religion or regulating conduct on the basis of its 
religious nature.156  Singling out one category of expressive association for 
disfavored treatment is clear viewpoint discrimination, which 
unconstitutionally assaults students’ First Amendment freedoms of speech and 
association.157 
                                                 
 153. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that the group’s 
message would be severely thwarted by the Court forcing inclusion of a member who opposes the 
message’s underlying principle); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 
557, 579 (1995) (holding that the government may not restrict speech merely to promote popular 
ideas or to discourage disfavored ideas). 
 154. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 660–61 
(“[P]ublic or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s expression does not justify the 
State’s effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would 
derogate from the organization’s expressive message.”); James Cleith Phillips, “All of the Blood 
and Treasure”: The Founders on Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, 
Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 30 MISS. C. L. REV. 15, 24 (2011) (arguing that the 
Founders would have had difficultly “understand[ing] how forcing religious intra-group diversity 
would not violate religious freedom and could be justified in the name of promoting diversity, 
especially when diversity could be achieved through the proliferation of diverse groups rather 
than the infiltration of groups by diverse members”). 
 155. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3012 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for American Islamic 
Congress  et  al.  as  Amicus  Curiae  Supporting  Petitioners,  Martinez,  130  S.  Ct.  2971  (No. 
O8-1371)). 
 156. See Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993). 
 157. See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority did not 
“defend the constitutionality of the [school’s] Nondiscrimination Policy” because the policy 
explicitly disfavored religious groups); see also Ryan C. Visser, Collision Course?: Christian 
Legal Society v. Kane Could Create a Split over the Right of Religious Student Groups to 
Associate  in  the  Face  of  Law  School  Antidiscrimination  Policies,  30  HAMLINE  L . REV. 
449, 476–77 (2007) (arguing that even if the original purpose of the school’s non-discrimination 
policies sought to remedy discrimination and foster cooperation, equality, and debate, the 
antidiscrimination policy ultimately promoted the school’s goal of inclusion and tolerance 
through coercion in violation of the First Amendment). 
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B.  Scrutiny Applied: The Answers Provided by Walker 
Where the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Alpha Delta failed to apply close 
scrutiny to discover how selective non-discrimination policies related to the 
limited forum or comported with viewpoint neutrality,158 the Seventh Circuit’s 
analysis in Walker succeeded.159 
In Walker, the Seventh Circuit reiterated that it “is a decidedly fatal 
objective” simply “to require speakers to modify the content of their 
expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with a 
message of their own.”160  Although SIU, like San Diego State in Alpha Delta, 
argued that de-recognition of a student organization did not contain a 
significant constitutional infringement, the Seventh Circuit adopted the 
Supreme Court’s holding from Healy, which prohibited indirect interferences 
of constitutional freedoms, noting that such protections are vital in the context 
of schools.161  Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that universities are 
prohibited from indirectly discriminating against religiously affiliated 
organizations through the denial of official organization recognition.162 
The   factual   question   remains:   What   was   the   basis   for   the   
targeted non-discrimination policy?  The Seventh Circuit held that SIU 
enforcement of its non-discrimination policy “can only be understood as 
intended to induce CLS to alter its membership standards—not merely to allow 
attendance by nonmembers.”163  SIU failed to identify any interest in forcing 
open CLS membership beyond an apparent interest in “eradicating or 
neutralizing particular beliefs contained in [CLS’s] creed.”164  The Ninth 
Circuit, on the other hand, did not reach this conclusion, in large part because 
the court did not ask the crucial factual questions.  The court overlooked the 
difference in the actual language between an “all access” policy and the 
selectively discriminate one at issue in Alpha Delta.165  It also provided great 
deference to the asserted didactic interests advocated by Hastings, and failed to 
access those interests in light of cases such as Widmar or Rosenberger, which 
                                                 
 158. Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 797–98 (9th Cir. Jan. 2011) 
(applying the “same analysis to both plaintiffs’ free speech and expressive association claims”), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1743 (2012). 
 159. See supra notes 98–106 (discussing Walker). 
 160. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hurley v. 
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995)).  In its rationale, the 
court highlighted that CLS’s requirement for membership and officers is a “conduct” 
requirement—the policies do not exclude students on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather 
sexual conduct, including heterosexual conduct outside of marriage and all homosexual conduct.  
Id. at 860. 
 161. Id. at 864 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–83 (1972)). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 863 (arguing that this coercion would impair CLS’s expressive associational 
message). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 797. 
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strictly scrutinized such interests in a university setting.166  The Alpha Delta 
court failed to look beyond the conclusory statements regarding the nature of 
the non-discrimination policy.  As such, it relinquished its duty to apply a 
higher level of scrutiny, one that is needed to ensure the constitutional validity 
of such a targeted policy.167  
C.  Scrutiny and Clarity: The Importance of Supreme Court Review 
Overall, the Seventh Circuit addressed the crucial questions that the Ninth 
Circuit abdicated: What is the message that San Diego State or SIU wants to 
convey with the non-discrimination policy?; What is the non-discrimination 
policy teaching about diversity?; and lastly, Why was the student group 
excluded?  Although San Diego State in Alpha Delta defended itself  by using 
a high level of generality, asserting interests of “respect, equality, diversity, 
and freedom”168 as an affirmative defense, the court should not have been 
convinced by such a costumed justification. 
Martinez held that a prohibition against all student groups employing any 
ideology, idea, or belief-oriented requirements for membership and leadership 
was constitutionally permissible.169  However, the universities in Alpha Delta 
and Walker permitted restrictions for membership and leadership, but 
prohibited religious student groups from requiring leadership to agree with the 
groups’ faith philosophy.170  These actions are plain viewpoint discrimination 
and irreconcilable with First Amendment protections and jurisprudence.171  
                                                 
 166. See supra Part I.B.; supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Alpha Delta Chi Delta v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790, 798–99 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Truth 
v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by Los Angeles 
Cty. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010) as recognized in Stone v. Advance Am. Cash Advance 
Cntrs., Inc., 08-CV-1549-AJB WMC, 2011 WL 5377638 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2011)), cert. denied, 
132  S.  Ct.  1743  (2012).   The  Court  applied  a  level  of  scrutiny  normally  used  to  evaluate 
a non-discrimination policy at a high school, which is arguably different than the level required 
for actions undertaken by a university. See DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 315 (3rd Cir. 
2008) (finding a difference in First Amendment protections in a public university versus at a 
public elementary school or high school); see also Brown, supra note 148, at 302–03 (“Generally, 
courts give more deference to the asserted pedagogical interests of elementary and secondary 
schools because of the far greater degree of paternalistic posture over students who are dependent 
on adult provision and protection and whose attendance is mandatory.”). 
 168. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 799. 
 169. Christian Legal Soc’y of the Univ. of Ca. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2977 (2010). 
 170. Compare id. at 2978, with Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 800–01 (noting that the university’s 
non-discrimination policy burdens some groups but not others), and Walker, 453 F.3d at 863 
(concluding that the university’s policy burdens CLS’s ability to express its viewpoint because 
accepting members who do not share its ideas impede the group’s ability to espouse its values). 
 171. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29, 834–35 
(1995) (holding that the university’s policy, predicated only on restricting speech, was 
unconstitutional). 
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Martinez does not support such a conclusion.172  Instead, Martinez addressed 
an “all-access” policy, not a policy that permits a state university to recognize 
some student groups’ ability to limit membership and deny that same ability to 
religiously affiliated student groups.173  Such viewpoint discrimination is 
inherent in the selective non-discrimination policies employed in Alpha Delta 
and, as such, the university’s action violates important First Amendment 
freedoms.174 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Like the Establishment Clause, religious disentanglement, or diversity 
initiatives, non-discrimination is an affirmative defense.  In a case in which a 
plaintiff makes a prima facie claim that a right of the forum has been violated, 
the state must respond with an affirmative defense demonstrating the 
legitimacy of the restriction.175  In Walker, the state could neither articulate nor 
demonstrate the legality of its purpose.176  More recently, in Alpha Delta, the 
Ninth Circuit did not even require the state to present an affirmative defense.  
In applying equal protection, non-discrimination, or an initiative for diversity 
within a limited forum, courts should require universities to articulate their 
purpose, the meaning of the term “diversity,” and how the policy seeks to 
achieve the ends of the created limited forum. 
The Ninth Circuit failed to question what the term “diversity” meant and 
what implicit message was contained within the exclusion rules.  These 
questions constitute a crucial step in evaluating any non-discrimination 
affirmative defense in limited forum cases.  Given the split among the circuits 
on this issue, it is vital for the Supreme Court to determine whether such 
selective non-discrimination is permissible in a limited forum and the level of 
scrutiny such questions require—preserving First Amendment freedoms on 
university campuses depends on it. 
 
                                                 
 172. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Disaster: The Worst 
Religious Freedom Case in Five Years, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 283, 299 (2011) (recognizing that 
under Martinez, state universities cannot condition forum access on expressive viewpoints). 
 173. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984. 
 174. Alpha Delta, 648 F.3d at 801; CLS Brief, supra note 9, at 222 (arguing that the Ninth 
Circuit missed the point, wrongly thinking that a “state university could engage in viewpoint 
discrimination as long as that was not its consciously intended purpose”). 
 175. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (disagreeing with the university’s 
argument that it had a compelling state interest in the separation of church and state and in 
ensuring compliance with its obligations under the Establishment Clause); see also Healy v. 
James, 408 U.S. 169, 186–87 (1972) (noting that the “government has the burden” of proving the 
legitimacy of its restriction). 
 176. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 863 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that SIU 
failed to identify any interest in forcing open CLS membership beyond an apparent interest in 
“eradicating or neutralizing particular beliefs contained in [CLS’s] creed”). 
